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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores three different institutions that underwent proposed reforms 
during the President of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015): the intelligence 
sector, the judiciary, and the media. Though the stated purpose of these reforms was to 
make more democratic institutions that had suffered under the military junta, in reality 
they were generally unsuccessful. Furthermore these institutions would be further 
changed under her successor, Mauricio Macri, still with little improvement to democracy.  
When examining these changes in the context of hyper-presidentialism, it is apparent that 
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Introduction and Background 
 
 Since the collapse of the last military dictatorship in 1983, Argentina has been a 
democracy. That is, Argentina has held a series of free and fair elections and been free of 
the large-scale state-sponsored violence that characterized the period termed by the 
military junta the “National Reorganization Process”. However, the transition from a 
military dictatorship and being governed by a succession of military generals to a 
democratic government has not been easy or smooth. In fact, transitioning from an 
oppressive authoritarian regime to a democracy requires significant reforms to 
institutions in order to make them more democratic, or at least to better serve democratic 
interests. Not surprisingly, institutional reform has been uneven and at times 
unsuccessful. Even more than 30 years since the military dictatorship, more remains to be 
done to make institutions more democratic. During the Presidency of Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner (2007-2015) there were attempts to reform several institutions that had been 
severely impeded and perverted under the military junta. All of the institutions in 
question did need reforms in order to function more democratically. However, the misuse 
of executive power caused all three reforms to be largely ineffective at democratizing the 
institutions in question. 
In connection with seeking to better understand Argentina's transition to 
democracy, I have elected to examine these three critical institutions-- the intelligence 
sector, the judicial branch, and the media. I maintain that these institutions are uniquely 
relevant to understanding Argentina's transition to democracy because during the military 
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government these institutions were either used in a manner directly counter to democracy 
(in the case of intelligence) or rendered functionally useless (in the case of the judiciary 
and media).  Since each of these institutions significantly contributes to or otherwise 
impacts a democracy, and each had significant obstacles to overcome in order to function 
democratically, examining how each institution has changed is critical to a more 
complete understanding of Argentina's transition to democracy.  
 In addition, since each of these three institutions was the subject of proposed 
large-scale reform by Fernández de Kirchner they serve as recent case studies. 
Importantly for the context of this paper, all the attempted reforms had several things in 
common. First, they we all controversial, and labeled by critics as undemocratic, 
particularly in the way they related to presidential power. Second, they were positioned 
by supporters as necessary in order to further democracy. That is, the supporters of 
reforms framed them in contrast to the way in which these institutions operated during 
the military dictatorship so that to oppose the proposed reforms was tantamount to 
supporting the institutions functioning in the same way they functioned during the 
military dictatorship.  
More recently, all these institutions have been subject to some form of 
modification by the new president Mauricio Macri. Macri’s election was looked at 
hopefully by international observers, particularly those more sympathetic to his center-
right ideological position and economic views. Generally speaking, the fact that he was 
the first non-radical, non-Peronist president elected since before the dictatorship was seen 
as a positive indicator for Argentina's evolving democracy. His platform confirmed these 
hopes. He stated that his administration would  “strengthen the rule of law, strictly 
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respecting the division of powers, the independence of justice and the constitutional 
principles and guarantees, together with full freedom of expression.”1 Even so, the first 
months of his presidency were marked by his own changes to the institutions that 
Fernández de Kirchner had attempted to reform, in different ways but often by decree. In 
this sense it is clear that the biggest threat to the development of a liberal democracy in 
Argentina does not lie with a single party or position on the ideological spectrum. 
Instead, the misuse of executive power (bolstered by the tradition of hyper-
presidentialism) transcends ideology and impedes meaningful democratic reform. 
After examining the literature on hyper-presidentialism and typologies of 
democracy and situating my argument in that context, I will examine each institution and 
compare the role each such institution conventionally or ideally plays in a liberal 
democracy to the role it played during the military dictatorship and throughout the 
transition to democracy. I will then critically examine the reforms proposed by Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, and how they demonstrate a misuse of executive power, and by 
extension the legacy of hyper-presidentialism.  Then I will critically examine the Macri 
administration’s response to these reforms, including what the changes are and the 
manner in which the changes were passed. To conclude I analyze what this means for the 
state of Argentine democracy.  
Hyper-Presidentialism 
Of the major forms of democracy (Presidential, Parliamentary, and Semi-
Presidential) Latin American countries (due in part to the influence of the U.S. 
1  Andrés Del Río, Roldán “Macri and the Judges,” Open Democracy, Jan. 21, 
2016.https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/andr-s-del-r-o-rold-n/macri-and-judges 
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constitution on Latin American constitutions) have generally favored a presidential 
democracy. In a presidential regime, the executive is popularly elected to serve a fixed 
term, and during that term they have the exclusive ability to wield executive power. This 
is in contrast to a parliamentary system, in which most authority lies in the legislature, 
and the members of parliament elect the head of government. This results in theoretical 
differences in the functions of these government systems and how they allocate power, 
and both systems have supporter and detractors.  In “Presidential or Parliamentary 
Democracy: Does it make a Difference?” Juan Linz argues that the presidential system is 
inherently inferior to the parliamentary system for several reasons. One reason was that it 
offered less fluidity than the parliamentary system, so far as it was very difficult to 
remove an executive who had lost the support of the people. Another reason was that the 
presidents executive power means there’s little incentive for coalition building or power-
sharing that exists in parliamentary governments, making politics more fragmented and 
polarized. Additionally there is the issue of executive-legislative gridlock, where 
government action is stalled by differences between the executive and legislative branch, 
both of which can claim some electoral legitimacy.2 In order to avoid this gridlock, 
particularly in times of crisis, a president can take unilateral action to enact policy. While 
there are constitutional limits on executive power, they can generally be circumvented 
with presidential decrees and other mechanisms designed to allow quick action in times 
of emergency.  In some countries, including Argentina, the result of this has been hyper-
presidentialism.  
2  Juan J. Linz,  “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it make a Difference?” in The Failure of 
Presidential Democracy, eds. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1994), 3-87. 
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Hyper-presidentialism occurs either when there are not sufficient limits on 
presidential power or the president is able to subvert the limits in place. Essentially it is 
when the executive office has too much power, officially or unofficially. The capacity for 
the president to act unilaterally in areas that are not the role of the executive is a symptom 
of hyper-presidentialism. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s intelligence, judicial, and 
media reforms each serve as examples of the executive making changes that could in 
practice strengthen the executive office, and reinforce hyper-presidentialism.  
 Contextualizing the role of the Argentinean president, they are similar in powers 
to the U.S. president, in that they act as Head of State, Head of Government, and 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.3 However, the Argentinean president can 
appoint many high office roles (including the cabinet) without legislative or independent 
electoral approval. In addition, the Argentinean president has significant control over the 
provinces, because they have significant control over the distribution of funds. Though 
the proposed 1994 reforms sought to limit this particular power, no law has been passed; 
the end result is that the President has enormous discretion over the distribution of much 
of the money that goes to the provinces.4 A president’s power comes from various 
sources. They have constitutional powers are the roles outlined in the constitution, and 
partisan powers which come from the president’s ability to control their party in the 
legislature.5 Beyond these main sources of power, presidents can wield influence to 
3 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto, and Natalia Volosin, "Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of 
Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Philippines," Berkeley Journal of International 
Law 29, no. 1 (2011): 250. 
4 Ibid., 251. 
5 Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 161. 
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varying extents over the judiciary and local politics. As a result, if limits on power are 
subverted, the executive can operate with almost complete control of the country.  
 In addition to structural reasons for hyper-presidentialism, there are also historical 
reasons in all of Latin America, including Argentina. The instability that occurred in 
Argentina well before the final military government, since it’s first attempts at 
democracy, made democratic institutions, generally, very weak. This included the 
institutions that were designed to check the executive (the legislative and judicial 
branch). With nearly constant regime change, policy programs became second to 
personalities. This resulted in significant control being vested in the executive.6 
Furthermore, after the brutality of the military junta, a democratic government that was 
able to offer some stability (even through executive strength) was better than a weak 
government that ran the risk of backsliding into military rule.  
 Particularly pertinent to the case of democracy in Argentina, both past and present 
is the case of presidential decrees. A presidential decree offers the opportunity for the 
president to sidestep the legislature and enact policy changes unilaterally. There are 
reasons for such an option to exist. As mentioned above, presidential systems often face 
gridlock. Situations could arise where waiting to navigate that gridlock to enact policy 
change could be detrimental if not dangerous. However, the use (and particularly the 
abuse) of these decrees has the power to substantially weaken democracy. In Argentina, 
presidents have more power to use decrees than in the United States for example, which 
6 Ibid., 155. 
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can lead to frequent abuse of decrees.  Adam Prezworski described this rule by decree 
with the following “People get a regular chance to vote, but not to choose”.7  
 This situation of Presidents abusing decrees arose many times in Argentina, 
specifically post-military government. While between 1853 and 1983 constitutional 
governments issued about 20 NUDs  (“Necessity and Urgency Decrees”) that number 
increased substantially after the re-transition to democratic rule.8 Logically, it makes 
sense that a government with weakened democratic institutions and fear of backsliding 
into a military dictatorship would make use of NUDs more, however this increase led to 
both missteps and the beginnings of a dangerous legacy. The first democratically elected 
president after the military junta, Raul Alfonsín, issued 10 NUDs (to contextualize this 
with the previous figure, Alfonsín was in office 6 years).9 This included his far-reaching 
Austral Plan.10 Alfonsín inherited a weak economy, and the Austral Plan was his attempts 
to solve it. However, the result was actually a worsening of the economy, to the extent 
that riots eventually led to his resignation. This is indicative of the major problem with 
decrees: even in the case of a crisis that needs resolution, swift action that is not checked 
by other branches can lead to missteps. Alfonsín’s successor was not more restrained, but 
actually was much more likely to use decrees. Carlos Menem became synonymous with 
ruling by decretazo, issuing 336 NUDs in one 5-year period.11  
 Use of decrees has not stopped in the 21st century. Eduardo Dunhalde and 
Fernández de Kirchner’s husband and predecessor, Nestor Kirchner both issued a number 
7  Adam Prezworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 187.  
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of decrees. While Fernández de Kirchner issued less, she still used controversial decrees, 
especially pertaining to economic policy. In addition to the potential for missteps, this 
sort of presidency had implications for the quality and future of Argentine democracy. 
From a philosophical standpoint, the continual use of decrees normalizes unilateral 
executive action, and the idea that the executive branch should be able to act relatively 
unimpeded. From a practical standpoint, it contributes to the weakening of other 
institutions, making the executive office more powerful. This concentration of power 
means that even without the use of decrees, the president can act in their own self-interest 
since the checks on their power are weaker, and popular support for executive action is 
stronger. Fernández de Kirchner, for example, had substantial partisan power, since her 
own party dominated the legislature. As a result the reforms she was able to pass, about 
the intelligence sector, judiciary, and media, were approved by the legislature. This 
legislative approval however, was not able to stop them from being politically motivated 
and largely ineffective at promoting democracy.   
While Fernández de Kirchner and her reforms clearly continued the legacy of 
hyper-presidentialism, Macri, though he is different from Fernández de Kirchner from 
both an ideological and partisan perspective, has not indicated a significant departure 
from this trend in his first months in office. While congress was in recess, Macri passed a 
number of NUDs. Though some of these have been successful so far, and were responses 
to situations that could be considered necessary and urgent, others were criticized as ways 
to avoid sending his policies through a largely unfriendly legislature. Specifically, several 
of these decrees dealt directly with the institutions Fernández de Kirchner had reformed. 
This indicates that the risk of hyper-presidential tendencies did not end with the victory 
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of a new political party, and misuse of executive power remains the biggest threat to the 
development of fully democratic institutions in Argentina.  
Typology of Democracy 
 For something to be a threat to the quality of democracy, it is important to 
establish what a democracy is, and the different variations that exist within it. One of the 
classic democratic theories is the one proposed by Robert Dahl in “Polyarchy”.  
According to Dahl, what we think of as democracies are actually polyarchies. According 
to Dahl, polyarchies have the following defining characteristics: effective participation, 
equal vote, enlightened understanding, agenda control, and maximum inclusiveness.  
Polyarchies also require certain institutions, like elected officials, free and fair elections, 
inclusive suffrage, the right to try to be elected, freedom of expression, right to seek 
alternative information, and associational autonomy.12  
 While Dahl recognized democracy as an unachievable ideal in which 
governments were completely responsive to their people, he viewed a polyarchy as the 
popular manifestation of democratic ideals. In addition to the effective presence of the 
institutions described above, the primary indicator of a polyarchy was free and fair 
elections with universal suffrage. In that sense, polyarchy is a relatively minimalist 
definition of democracy, and one for which Argentina certainly qualifies. Dahl’s 
definition does not, however, account for the association of democracy with a high 
degree of civil liberties. As a result, Dahl's model of a polyarchy does not account for the 
dangers of hyper-presidentialism and the resulting poorly functioning institutions that 
12 Robert Alan Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)  
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pose the greatest threat to Argentinean democracy. What is more useful is to examine two 
definitions that emerged in the 1990s to discuss the state of governance in more recent 
democracies worldwide, including those in Latin America. These definitions go beyond 
the procedural definition of democracy, to distinguish the shortcomings of governance 
that can exist within democracies. 
One such idea can be found in Guillermo O'Donnell’s definition of delegative 
democracy. First defined in his 1994 Journal of Democracy article, a delegative 
democracy meet’s Dahl’s criteria for a polyarchy, but is not a representative democracy.  
Specifically, he made the distinction between older, more consolidated liberal 
democracies, and more recent democracies (like many Latin American ones, including 
Argentina) which he termed “delegative democracies”. Delegative democracies, he said, 
were neither at imminent risk of returning to authoritative control, nor were they on the 
course to become fully consolidated representative democracies.13  His principle 
argument is that a government has two democratic transitions. This first transition was 
from authoritarian rule to an elected government. The second transition (which is often 
more difficult) is from an elected government to a fully consolidated democratic regime, 
with all the institutions and norms that come with it. O’Donnell argued that in the case of 
many Latin American (and other) countries that transitioned to democracy in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the second transition never occurred.14 Instead, resilient (but not democratic 
in the traditional sense) governments emerged. These governments lacked the liberties 
that have come to be associated with democracies, but O’Donnell argued that they were 
13 Guillermo A. O’Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 56. 
14 Ibid. 
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actually more democratic, just less liberal.15 They are characterized by free and fair 
elections, which then give the victor mandate to rule relatively unimpeded. In delegative 
democracies, democratic institutions (with the exception of the executive and elections) 
are very weak, so there are few checks on the power of the executive. This results in 
comparatively swift policy making, but a large margin for error (as can be seen in the 
economic policies of Argentina).16 Delegative democracies can rely heavily on 
presidential decrees or other means for an executive to act relatively unimpeded.17  A 
delegative democracy is distinct from a liberal democracy in that they have different 
conceptions of what the role of a government, particularly of an executive should be. In a 
liberal democracy, elected government officials (including the executive) are elected on 
the basis that they will represent their constituents. In delegative democracy, however, 
elected officials view their election as a mandate for them to govern as they see fit.18 This 
view explains the emergence of hyper-presidential tendencies, and the resulting 
institutional reforms of the Fernández de Kirchner administration.  
  The emergence of a delegative democracy from the military government follows 
logically from historical patterns. There are benefits to delegative democracy. As 
mentioned when discussing presidential decrees, if the executive is not impeded by a 
disagreeable legislative branch, they can take action quickly (though not always 
correctly). The ability to take quick action, particularly in the early days of the transition, 
when a military coup d'état loomed as a possibility, was valuable. However, it established 
an executive branch that went too unchecked, and the legacy of that still affects 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 60. 
17 Smith, 162. 
18 O’Donnell, 65. 
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Argentinean democracy today.  According to O’Donnell, delegative democracies are 
consolidated in the sense that they do not face imminent risk of falling back into 
authoritarian government. However, they also have proven difficult to transition into 
liberal democracies.19 This is important in the case of Argentina, where even in the face 
of major democratic victories (like a win for a formerly underrepresented party) the 
underlying tradition of hyper-presidentialism seems to have stubbornly remained, in no 
small part due to the president’s capacity to act unchecked (either by decree or inefficient 
checks).  
In addition to the concept of delegative democracy, in the late 1990s another way 
of describing the trend of emerging democracies that weren’t fully consolidated and 
liberal Western democracies: illiberal democracies. Democracy that goes beyond 
elections to protect civil liberties and function in a representative manner constitutes a 
liberal democracy. According to Fareed Zakaria a liberal democracy is marked not only 
by the procedural elements of establishing a regime “but also by the rule of law, a 
separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, 
and property”.20 Though he acknowledges that those ideals do not share a theoretical or 
historical basis linking them to democracy, they have been linked for a century.21  
 The most important implication of examining Argentina through the ways it falls 
short of a liberal democracy is not an indication that it is going to backslide to 
authoritarianism. In his article (written during the Carlos Menem administration) Zakaria 
acknowledges that Argentina is a “modest offender” whose shortcomings primarily relate 
19 Ibid. 
20 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 no. 5 (2007): 22. 
21 Ibid. 
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to the previously discussed issue of hyper-presidentialism and a lack of checks on 
executive power.22 However, much like O’Donnell emphasized that delegative 
democracy was not a transitional stage, Zakaria notes that cases of liberal democracies 
emerging from illiberal democracies are rare.23  
Both delegative democracy and illiberal democracy describe the ways recent 
democracies, like Argentina, have fallen short of fully consolidated liberal democracies. 
However, they describe different elements of democracy. Delegative democracy is used 
to describe where power is held, and the process of enacting policies. Illiberal democracy 
focuses more on the nature of the policies enacted in those democracies.24 In the case of 
Argentina, that means that when the executive wields a high amount of power, it is 
exhibiting the characteristics of a delegative democracy. When that power is used to pass 
policies that limit civil liberties or other liberal ideals, then it is an illiberal democracy. 
The theories of delegative and illiberal democracies can both be applied to 
Argentina. Illiberal democracies are often the result of delegative democracies, but not 
always. In the case of Argentina, these two theories are linked by their common outcome 
of hyper-presidentialism. Tendencies of Argentinean presidents to act delegatively, 
illiberally, or both threaten the quality of Argentinean democracy. The consequences of 
hyper-presidentialism are not just theoretical. It is not only a threat for the way it falls 
short of the democratic ideal. A government where the executive is not being checked is 
likely to make much bigger policy mistakes. Furthermore, the executive is freer to engage 
in corruption when it is not likely to be discovered or tried by a truly independent entity. 
22 Ibid., 23. 
23 Ibid., 24. 
24 Smith, 12.  
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Given that both the Fernández de Kirchner and Macri regimes have faced accusations of 
corruption these concerns are real and important. The only way for Argentinean 
democracy to become truly liberal, consolidated, and transparent is to overcome hyper-























The task of reforming intelligence services in Argentina has presented a unique 
challenge. Since 1983, the government has struggled with how to reform the institution 
that was responsible for a large amount of the state sponsored violence during the 
national reorganization process. In 2015, Fernández de Kirchner proposed reasonably 
comprehensive legislation, however critics called it politically motivated and ineffective 
at best, and undemocratic at worst. Ultimately, parts of the legislation could be used to 
give the executive more control over the intelligence sector, which creates substantial 
potential for abuse, while other elements were indeed more democratic. Ultimately 
intelligence reform is complicated by the multiple areas that must be considered, but 
Fernández de Kirchner’s willingness to utilize reform for political gains, and Macri’s 
subsequent willingness to use decree in opposition, make the task of reform even more 
challenging.   
The Relationship between Intelligence and Democracy 
 When institutions are transitioning from a dictatorship to democracy, intelligence 
organizations offer a particular challenge. Intelligence requires a level of opacity, 
whereas democracy needs transparency.25 Essentially a tension arises between the level 
of accountability a government needs in order to be truly democratic, and the level of 
secrecy an intelligence agency requires to truly be effective. This is further complicated 
25 Florina Matei and Thomas Bruneau, "Intelligence Reform in New Democracies," Democratization 18, 
no. 3 (2011): 605.  
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in the case of Argentina, where the intelligence agency during the military dictatorship 
was strongly linked to disappearances and other acts of state-sponsored terror.  
 Furthermore in Argentina, like many South American countries, the military 
maintained a powerful role without facing many (if any) external threats. As a result, the 
focus of the military was more on internal security.26 In the case of Argentina, that meant 
combating a perceived communist threat. Military intelligence, then, was focused on 
monitoring political dissidents within the country. This information gathering of citizens 
is counter to the civil liberties a democracy is supposed to protect. When transitioning to 
democracy, Argentina was left with a secretive, military dominated intelligence sector 
that had been historically concerned with domestic spying. The democratization of the 
intelligence sector was not an easy process, and the challenges it posed are still pertinent 
today. How can an agency (or agencies) reliant on secrecy be democratized? All 
democracies confront the paradox of transparency with regard to their intelligence 
agencies, yet all countries have some sort of intelligence agency, including fully 
consolidated democracies.27 It is possible to make an intelligence agency as democratic 
as possible (though inherently undemocratic in nature) while maintaining the agencies 
effectiveness.  In the case of Argentina, and any democracy that transitioned from 
military rule, the first and foremost requirement is civilian control. An intelligence 
apparatus that is primarily controlled by the civilian government is theoretically more 
responsive to the will of the people, and therefore more democratic. Bringing intelligence 
26 Juan Rial, “Armies and Civil Society in Latin America” in Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, ed. 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 51. 
27 Matei, 605.  
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under civilian control is complicated. Once intelligence is moved to civilian led agencies 
there are still factors to consider in order for it to function democratically.  
After civilian control is securely established, the next issue that intelligence must 
face is checks on power. After being brought under civilian control, the intelligence 
apparatus must not be under the exclusive control of the executive branch. A certain 
degree of legislative oversight of operations and budgeting are important. In addition, the 
judiciary can play a role in checking intelligence. For example, in some democracies the 
judiciary is in charge of issuing warrants for information gathering, and determining the 
consequences for those that have abused their role in intelligence via a trial. However, as 
Priscila Carlos Brandão Antunes observes, “Although the judicial branch may be called 
on to solve disputes between citizens and the behavior of the services of intelligence, it 
rarely does so”.28 This is partially because judiciary often lacks the expertise to 
adequately fill roles that would limit the power of the intelligence sector. The capacity of 
each of the legislative and judicial branches to balance the autonomy of intelligence 
agencies and their relationship to the executive branch should be considered when 
democratizing an intelligence agency.  
 Another test in determining whether an intelligence agency can function in the 
framework of a democracy is assessing what the objectives of the agency are. When an 
intelligence agency focuses on internal security, it leads to violations of the civil rights of 
their citizens, and can be used as a tool of political repression. Though as mentioned, 
foreign wars are rare in South America, there are other threats (like terrorism) that create 
28 Priscila Carlos Brandão Antunes, “Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina,” in 
Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau, 
Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007),199. 
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a legitimate need for external security. That being said, the amorphous nature of these 
threats means that without particular guidelines in place outlining intelligence gathering, 
intelligence agencies are liable to act undemocratically in the name of national security. 
 When making their intelligence services as democratic as possible, Argentina 
faced these three primary challenges: subordinating the military’s role, enacting checks 
on power, and limiting the functions of intelligence. The military question was resolved 
rather quickly and effectively in the reform process, but other questions pertaining to 
function and limits on power are on going.  
Historical Origins of Intelligence in Argentina 
 To understand the transition of Argentina’s intelligence agencies, it is necessary 
to understand their history. Argentina’s modern intelligence history begins in 1946, when 
President Peron created the Office of Coordinated State Information, which would be 
replaced by the State Information Service under the presidency in 1951. At the same 
time, intelligence services for the branches of the military were set up. The State 
Information Secretariat (SIDE) was established, and 10 years after that a new intelligence 
body under the President was set up, the National Intelligence Center (CNI).29 During the 
National Reorganization Process these intelligence agencies would become essential to 
achieving the politically repressive objectives of the state. During the military 
dictatorship, all intelligence was military intelligence. A law from 1973 (Secret Law 
20,195) specified that both the secretary and undersecretary of SIDE had to be senior 
29 Eduardo E. Estevez, “Intelligence Community Reforms: The Case of Argentina,” in Intelligence 
Elsewhere, ed. Phillip H.J. Davies, Kristian Gustafason (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2013), 222. 
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ranking members of the military.30 SIDE was used to conduct information gathering on 
thousands of people determined to be political dissidents, from students to labor 
organizers. This information was then used to carry out the violent torture and 
disappearances of these dissidents.31 This legacy created challenges during the 
reemergence of democracy.  
Intelligence Reform During the Transition 
 When President Alfonsín was elected in 1983 one of his main objectives was a 
clean break with the past. He was responsible for the trials of many participants in the 
dirty war, both military junta members and guerillas. He was responsible for establishing 
the commission that published information on the disappeared.32 In general, Alfonsín laid 
the groundwork for the transitional justice and historical memory that have aided 
Argentina’s transition to democracy. He also emphasized that a subordination of the 
military under civilian rule was of primary importance, which included the intelligence 
sector. This proved to be incredibly difficult. Under Alfonsín, Roberto Pena became the 
first civilian head of SIDE.33 This was a positive development for civil-military relations, 
but resulted in problems. Pena eliminated many military officers from SIDE, instead 
appointing a fellow civilian undersecretary. This was met with significant push back from 
the military, and resulted in a very tense period for civil-military relations.34  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 223. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 224. 
                                                        
 21 
 Part of this tension was a result of the National Defense Law 23,554 (1988), 
which significantly limited the military’s monopoly on intelligence. As mentioned, an 
important part of reforming civil military relations for democracy is focusing the military 
on external threats. National Defense Law 23,554 did just that. Specifically, it replaced 
the previous National Security Doctrine, limiting the military to only addressing external 
threats. With regards to intelligence, this meant that the military could no longer engage 
in intelligence gathering practices for domestic political ends. This caused tension with 
the military, which steadfastly maintained that domestic surveillance was squarely within 
their domain.35  
In the early 1990s, the first true interaction between the intelligence sector and 
congress began, with the ENI offering a course for advisers in both the legislative and 
executive branches, and organizing an International Seminar on Congressional Oversight 
of Intelligence Agencies and Activities, in collaboration with NGOS.36 This was a 
positive step in checking executive power over intelligence, because some degree of 
legislative control in the structure of a country’s intelligence agencies is necessary for 
democracy. However, the different political ideologies represented in the legislature 
made the process a difficult one. In 1993 when a bill was informally released for 
consideration of the executive debates in the legislature were ignited. The majority 
drafted a bill resembling the current system, in that intelligence was highly centralized, 
while the minority favored more defined distinctions between foreign and domestic 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.,225. 
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intelligence and different legislative and judicial controls on different elements of 
intelligence.37 
The Internal Security Law 24, 059, passed in 1992 was a positive step for 
legislative oversight of intelligence. The law established the National Congress Joint 
Committee for the Oversight of Internal Security and Intelligence Agencies. It also 
created the first democratic directorate, under the executive. This law was important in 
distinguishing between internal security and defense, and granting the Ministry of the 
Interior power over what was considered internal security, meaning that the Ministry of 
the Interior was responsible for coordinating police intelligence.38 The Bicameral 
Commission for the Supervision of Intelligence Agencies and Activities, created by 
Internal Security Law 24, 059, was the first time that the legislative branch had been 
given the capacity for control and oversight of intelligence operations.39 
One of the most sweeping intelligence reforms in recent Argentinean history was 
the National Intelligence Law 25,520, passed on November 27, 2001. The law was the 
result of an 8-month consensus building process in the legislature.40 This law established 
the structure of the national intelligence system (before Fernández de Kirchner’s reforms) 
as well as included important protections against abuse of intelligence.  
The law defined the three bodies. The SI (formerly SIDE) is the highest ranking 
of the intelligence agencies, and is under the direct control of the presidency, and 
generally manages various intelligence activities.41 It is also led by a civilian (as the 
37 Ibid. 
38 Antunes, 201.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Estevez, 226. 
41 Ibid., 228. 
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SIDE was since 1983).42  The second agency established was the National Directorate for 
Criminal Intelligence (DINIC) whose charter was to coordinate intelligence efforts by the 
police, including coordinating both national and provincial police forces. The DINIC is 
the body that controls intelligence pertaining to internal security, so they handle domestic 
surveillance. They are overseen by the Ministry of the Interior. National Intelligence Law 
25,520 also established the National Directorate for Strategic Military Intelligence 
(DINIEM), which handled all military intelligence.43  
 As far as safeguards against abuse of power, the law explicitly states that no 
intelligence agency can “obtain information, produce intelligence or store data on 
individuals solely because of their race, religious faith, private actions, or political 
opinion, or because of their membership in partisan, social, union, community, 
cooperative, assistance, cultural, or labor organizations or for any legal activity in any 
sphere of action.”44  In addition the law explicitly makes the intelligence agencies 
apolitical, by prohibiting them from exerting influence over any realm of political affairs 
or public opinion.45 In the realm of civilian control, National Intelligence Law 25,520 
gave the Bicameral Commission on Intelligence permanent control over intelligence 
activities including the role of reviewing and suggesting alterations for the president’s 
annual National Intelligence Plan and investigating any complaints made against 
intelligence services.46  
42 Antunes, 213. 
43Estevez, 228. 
44 Ley de Inteligencia Nacional 25.520,http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-
74999/70496/norma.htm, translation by Brito. 
45 Estevez, 228. 
46 Antunes, 214. 
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 Not unexpectedly, an issue that faced significant resistance from the intelligence 
community was the efforts for political control of the intelligence budget.  Checks and 
oversight on the intelligence budget is an important democratic control to help combat 
issues including abuse of funds and bribery. Implementation of oversight and controls, 
the intelligence community argued, was an example of the legislature exerting too much 
power over what they saw as an executive branch issue. Nonetheless, control over the 
budget was imposed, which marked an important step in the democratization of 
intelligence in that intelligence agencies were held accountable for their spending and 
could no longer only provide an aggregated view of their expenditures.47  
 Given the legacy of illegal information gathering, a topic that resulted in a stark 
divide was communication interception (relating primarily at the time to wiretapping). 
Some believed that intelligence agencies should maintain this role, in spite of the history 
of using it for spying on citizens and repression. Others believed that the role should be 
given to the judiciary. Communication interception when used properly was solely for the 
purpose of prosecuting criminals, so some believed that the responsibility naturally fell to 
the judiciary. Critics of that stance cited lack of experience with such tasks and 
corruption as reasons that the job belonged to intelligence agencies. In the final law, 
communication interception did remain the purview of the SIDE (and the SI), though 
different checks were put on to attempt to ensure that the power was not abused.  For 
example, the law requires that the SI prove a viable need for the wiretap, and the 
47 Ibid., 213. 
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secretary of intelligence or a delegate had to obtain a warrant from a federal judge.48 This 
legislative decision would have significant implications for Argentinean politics.  
 In order to protect intelligence agencies and allow them to maintain 
effectiveness, the Bicameral Commission on Intelligence was subject to fines and legal 
penalties for disclosing information that would put security of the nation at risk or 
damage intelligence agencies capacity to fulfill their function. The penalties were 
comparable to what members of the intelligence community faced for disclosing sensitive 
information.49 This allowed the legislature to have a role in controlling intelligence 
without damaging the level of secrecy needed for intelligence to function.  
Intelligence Scandals 
Even though reforms had taken place, the Argentinean Intelligence apparatus has 
not been able to fully break its association with past wrongdoings. This is partially 
because even after the transition to democracy, the intelligence community has been 
marred by scandals, which illustrate the challenges of democratizing intelligence after a 
military dictatorship. This included several scandals of purported ideological surveillance 
during the Menem presidency. The first occurred in 1993, when documents leaked to the 
press indicated that the government had been collecting intelligence on teachers, students, 
and trade unionists.50 This surveillance had been ordered by the Ministry of the Interior, 
illustrating the civilian control is not enough to combat misuse of intelligence.    
48 Ibid., 211.  
49 Ibid., 215. 
50 Estevez, 224. 
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In 1998, another intelligence scandal broke, one that directly implicated the 
military. The Air Force had been conducting surveillance on a women’s NGO, as well as 
several journalists. While the responsible officers were prosecuted, there was not any 
resulting structural or political change to military intelligence.51 The next intelligence 
scandal, in 2000, resulted in much more substantial changes. It came to light that the 
Third Army Corps was using surveillance to target political parties, unions, and student 
groups in Cordoba. As a consequence of this scandal, not only were 1,000 personnel 
dismissed, but also the entire organizational structure was overhauled, with the secret 
budget being cut. However, later in 2000, the intelligence chief, Fernando De Santibedes 
resigned when it was revealed that through declaring expenditures that were not actually 
made, SIDE was retaining a funds that were not overseen by any sort of body, allowing 
them to essentially fund any operation they wanted.52 
In addition to scandals regarding unlawful surveillance, there have also been 
concerns about legislation related to domestic surveillance. The Data Retention Law 25, 
873 was known as the “Spy Law” and it required telecommunications and Internet 
companies to have the capacity to intercept communications for the Judiciary or Public 
Ministry.53 In 2005, applications of the Spy Law were suspended by presidential decree, 
and in 2009 the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional.54  
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The State of Intelligence in the 21st Century 
 Though the intelligence community has seen a number of positive reforms, 
specifically with regards to the subordination of the military’s role, intelligence reform as 
an issue is still being discussed in Argentinean politics. Specifically, in January 2015 
major reforms were proposed when Fernández de Kirchner proposed dissolution of the 
SI.55 In its place would be a new intelligence agency, the Federal Intelligence Agency 
(AFI).56 Her argument for broad reform was based on the premise that not enough has 
been done to reform the structure of the intelligence apparatus since the end of the 
military dictatorship. The AFI, compared to the SI, would be smaller in size and more 
transparent with its funding. Kirchner advocated the reforms by saying "We need to make 
the intelligence services more transparent because they have not served the interests of 
the country"57 and fellow Peronist Diana Conti agreed, claiming that reform would 
advance “the democratization of the country's intelligence services”.58  
It is true that while there have been a number of reforms to the intelligence sector 
since 1983, the process has been quite protracted with no defining moment or significant 
overhaul; and as a result, the intelligence sector of the past was, in the collective mind of 
the people, not that different from the dictatorship. Fernández de Kirchner made attempts 
to leverage that association in order to garner support for her reforms. Supporters of 
Kirchner’s reform saw it as a step that was long overdue. Provincial legislator Marcelo 
Sain claimed, “The intelligence services have been used for political espionage, financing 
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of political campaigns and control over the judiciary, there are judges, prosecutors and 
congressmen who are tied to SIDE”.59 The fact that Sain referred to the SI by its 
dictatorship-era name (as many people do) is evidence that the connection between the 
two was strong in spite of the previous attempts at reform.  
The call for reform and the stated goal of transparency were not inherently 
controversial. However, as necessary as intelligence reforms may be in order to separate 
from the past, there were plenty of reasons to be skeptical of Fernández de Kirchner’s 
proposals as a step forward. A major concern was how funding in the new agency would 
be controlled. Legislators who oppose the new agency say that it is unclear exactly what 
the controls on funding the bill specified are, and how they would work.60 For a reform 
that was promoted on the grounds of transparency, this was an important question. The 
new bill also notably changed the way wiretapping is handled. As discussed previously, 
after debating the issue National Intelligence Law 25,520 made wiretapping the job of 
intelligence services, but the new law would move wiretapping to the office of the 
Attorney General.61 This is particularly relevant when considering the relationship 
between Fernández de Kirchner and the Attorney General Alejandra Gils Carbó. She is 
viewed as a Kirchner and Peronist party loyalist.62 This particular component of the 
legislation was an example of how an executive can reinforce the strength of their office 
indirectly. Though transferring wiretapping capability to the judiciary does not in theory 
59 Jonathan Blitzer, "Argentina Debates Sweeping Intelligence Reform after Prosecutor’s Death," Al 
Jazeera America, February 11, 201,. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/11/argentina-votes-on-
sweeping-intelligence-reform-after-prosecutors-death.html.  
60 "Argentina Congress Votes to Dissolve Intelligence Agency." BBC News. February 26, 2015.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Joshua Partlowand Irene Caselli, “In Argentina, distrust over president’s move to abolish intelligence 
agency,” The Washington Post, January 27, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-
argentina-distrust-over-presidents-move-to-abolish-intelligence-agency/2015/01/27/c46c5b1e-a632-11e4-
a162-121d06ca77f1_story.html 
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strengthen the executive, in this case, previous relationships could grant the president 
substantial political control (and room for abuse). Still other critics were not concerned 
with the substance of the reform (because they believe there was no substantial change) 
but believed the reform to be the president’s way of distracting from the death of 
prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who was found dead in mysterious circumstances right 
before he was supposed to testify against her.63 Additionally, critics of the bill cited 
concerns that the AFI would be taking over investigative powers from other government 
agencies, like the Ministry of Security. Both the previous law and Fernández de 
Kirchner’s reforms allow the government to justify some criminal investigations, which 
those who believe the operational functions of an agency should be as limited as possible 
saw as damaging the capacity of the reform to be meaningful.64 Furthermore the reform 
bill was rushed to a vote, which even those who supported the content of the reform saw 
as negative.65  
A commonality of these criticisms is that they all indicated that there were 
political reasons for the reforms that went beyond Fernández de Kirchner’s stated 
purpose of democratizing the intelligence services. As previously discussed, though a 
security necessity, intelligence is often by its very nature opaque and undemocratic. As a 
result, if it does not operate independently enough it is easily abused. Parts of Fernández 
de Kirchner’s reform, like the wiretapping, could be used for illegitimate purposes. In 
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the Nisman case, and the fact it was seemingly rushed to a vote, seemed to further 
confirm that the actions were not simply democratic for democracies sake.  
Fernández de Kirchner’s initial proposal underwent some changes in the 
legislature, but was eventually passed by congress.66 The SI was dissolved, and replaced 
by the AFI, which though still under executive control, has a director and deputy who 
receive congressional approval, which is a positive step.67 Wiretapping activities were 
moved to the office of the Attorney General.68 Supporters of the reforms saw this as a 
way to end the “promiscuous relationship between the intelligence community and 
important sectors of the federal justice system” as Paula Litvachky, director of the Justice 
and Security Program at the Center for Legal and Social Studies, put it.69 However, as 
mentioned, critics saw this as troubling given the close relationship Fernández de 
Kirchner shared with Gils Carbó.  
One politician that adamantly opposed the reforms for the reasons stated above 
was then-Buenos Aires Mayor Macri, who said, “This is not an issue the president wants 
for her legacy. It is an effort to gain political advantage at a time of disillusionment, 
annoyance and anger.”70  In addition Macri was outspoken both during and after his 
election about looking into Nisman’s death, which he believed the intelligence reform 
was partially used to distract from.  As a consequence, he has taken particular measures 
to discredit the reforms of Fernández de Kirchner’s government. A particular target has 
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been the Attorney General. As mentioned, Kirchner’s reforms gave wiretapping power to 
Gils Carbó, and critics considered it a way for Fernández de Kirchner to gain control. 
Macri took away this power, with Decree 256/2015. Wiretapping powers had been 
shifted to the attorney general, and the decree gave the Supreme Court these powers.71 
Though changing a disputed part of had been done with the Kirchner reforms, Macri’s 
use of decree was noteworthy, especially when contrasted with the passage of the law (in 
spite of criticisms) through the legislature.  
 Ultimately, in spite of her lofty claims about finally reforming the intelligence 
sector, Fernández de Kirchner’s reforms offered little in the way of making intelligence 
agencies significantly more transparent or accountable. Though some elements of the 
legislation could have had actual negative consequences (the shift of wiretapping 
responsibility, for example), on the whole the reform was primarily a politically 
motivated reshuffling. In the context of hyper-presidentialism, Fernández de Kirchner 
used her considerable executive power to pass legislation that served her political 
interests (while doing little for the interest of democracy), thus protecting her 
considerable power. Alternatively, Macri used the executive strength (in the form of a 
decree) to undo part of the reform, which also served the political purpose of weakening 
the Attorney General’s office. The capacity of the executive to enact legislation for 
primarily political purposes (instead of serving the interests of the people) is both a 
71 "Oficial: El Gobierno Suspendió La Aplicación Del Nuevo Código Procesal Penal Y Traspasó Las 
Escuchas Judiciales a La Corte Suprema," La Nacion, December 29, 2015, 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1857916-oficial-el-gobierno-suspendio-la-aplicacion-del-nuevo-codigo-
procesal-penal-y-traspaso-las-escuchas-judiciales-a-la-corte-suprema.  
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symptom of hyper-presidentialism and a reason for its resilience, and an obstacle to 

























In 2013, Fernández de Kirchner proposed a large and comprehensive judicial 
reform bill. The judiciary was debilitated by the military junta and had faced several 
reforms in the years that followed, but not all of them made it more democratic. As a 
result, though many presidents since 1983 have undertaken the project of judicial reform, 
the process is ongoing. Some reforms were useful in combating the institutional 
weakness, but other furthered the role of the court as a rubber stamp for the executive. 
When Fernández de Kirchner proposed her legislation few doubted necessity of reform, 
but many took issue with the nature her reforms. Though she advocated them as the 
solution to the malfunction that had plagued the judiciary, the content of the reforms 
served to give the executive substantial power over the judiciary, threatening judicial 
independence.  
Judicial Independence and Democracy 
An independent judiciary is critical for a well functioning democracy, while also 
being in tension with it.  From an ideological standpoint, and independent judiciary 
serves as a check on other branches of government, and protects rule of law and civil 
liberties. From a practical standpoint, an independent judiciary is necessary to protect a 
countries global standing. However in Argentina, building an independent judiciary came 
with several challenges. The legacy of authoritarianism, as well as the presidential system 
with a historically strong executive presents structural challenges to judicial reform.72  In 
72 G. Shabbir Cheems, Building Democratic Institutions (Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 2005), 
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“Building Democratic Institutions” G. Shabbir Cheems lays out the four aspects of 
judicial independence. These are “autonomy from other branches of government, 
detachment of judges from conflicting parties, detachment of judges from specific 
ideologies, and avoidance of public pressures”.73 Cheems acknowledges there are 
elements of this that are counter to pure democratic ideals (for example there is no 
democratic way to ensure judges are not pressured by the public or the media). However 
the four criteria still offer a good framework for examining judicial reform since the end 
of the military dictatorship.  
Judicial independence requires strong institutions. That is, the institutions that 
administer the courts must be capable of functioning independently (with proper 
institutional framework and adequate funding and expertise). In addition to empowering 
the judicial branch to function on it’s own, the other branches (particularly the executive 
branch) must be restrained. Ideally, regulations have to be put in place that keep the 
executive from stacking the supreme court or otherwise wielding undue influence in the 
judiciary.  
Essentially, judicial independence lies in both if the judiciary can challenge the 
executive (is there an institutional framework in which such a process could occur, that 
could not be superseded by the executive) and if it would want to challenge the executive 
(does the executive control the judiciary to such an extent that viewpoint counter to their 
own are not meaningfully represented).74 Ensuring that the judiciary meets these 
175. 
73 Ibid., 173. 
74 Matias Iaryczower, Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi, “Judicial Independence in Unstable 
Environments, Argentina 1935-1998,” American Journal of Political Science 46, No. 4 (Oct., 2002): 699. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 35 
institutional criteria has been an ongoing challenge since the restoration of the democracy 
in 1983.  
The Judiciary During the Dictatorship 
 Even before the years of the final military dictatorship, the judiciary struggled 
with Argentina’s political upheaval. Since 1930 (when there was the first coup) 
Argentina experienced 6 interruptions of democracy, the last being the junta that 
governed until 1983.75 This general instability affected the capacity of the Supreme 
Court. Though appointments to the Supreme Court are for life, between the years of 1930 
and 1998 (after the reintroduction of democracy) the average tenure for a Supreme Court 
justice was only 4.6 years.76 Since the tenure for a president during that time period was 
only 2.6 years this turnover is not surprising, but it is still indicative of an alarming 
institutional norm that would take years of relative stability and institutional reforms to 
normalize. Before 1930, 82% of justices left because of death or retirement. In contrast 
between 1930 and 1998 only 9% left for those reasons, with 91% being impeached or 
irregularly removed or resigning.77 This climate of instability has a very specific result on 
judicial independence. The longer a judge sits on the court, in a functional democracy, 
the more likely they are to be working under a president of a different political persuasion 
than them. Alternatively in the years of political upheaval only occasionally would judges 
be working under an executive they were in political opposition to. This meant that more 
often than not, the courts failed to fulfill the second institutional requirement of judicial 
75 Ibid., 701. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.,702. 
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independence, which is required for them to fulfill the first one. It didn’t matter if the 
courts had political constraints allowing them to defy the government, because on the 
whole they didn’t want to. When justices depart and are replaced at a natural rate, there 
aren’t usually rapid shifts in the balance of the court, because replacements are generally 
made by presidents of different parties.78 When the president has the power to appoint a 
large number of the court though, judicial independence suffers.79  
During the years of the Dirty War, the judicial branch, operating under 
authoritarian control, was a tool of the military government80. The judicial branch during 
the dictatorship can be characterized much more by what it didn’t do than by what it did. 
The National Reorganization Process was a time of massive, widespread atrocities. 
Thousands were disappeared and many more were tortured or experienced some other 
sort of unlawful treatment at the hands of the government. During the regime under 
which these crimes were committed, however, there were no trials for those perpetrating 
these human rights abuses (the state). Rather, it was the victims who were treated as 
criminals. Their crime in many instances was political or ideological opposition to the 
ruling government. Even so, they didn’t receive due process or any other sort of 
conventional protections a democracy should have in place for the accused. In contrast, a 
genuinely independent judiciary would have been able to protect the civil liberties of 
citizens from the assault they faced from the rest of the government. As Cheems argues, 
however, “In a military dominated or other form of authoritarian government, the 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.,703. 
80 Elin Skaar, Judicial Independence and Human Rights in Latin America: Violations, Politics, and 
Prosecution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011),48. 
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independent judiciary is the first victim”.81 This was certainly true in the case of 
Argentina. Not only was the Supreme Court stacked with judges that were all the 
ideologically aligned with the junta, but the majority of provincial and federal appellate 
judges were also appointed by the junta.82 The justices appointed after the coup approved 
the use of military tribunals to try cases of suspected subversion because, the government 
argued, the country was in a state of war.83 This lack of independence resulted in a 
judiciary that was incapable of acting as a check against government overreach and was a 
critical enabler in allowing the National Reorganization Process and the horrors it 
entailed to exist.  The legacy of the judiciary during the dictatorship is one of public 
distrust and institutional weakness, and its consequences have carried into the 21st 
century, in spite of various attempts at reform.  
Judicial Reform During the Transition to Democracy 
When Alfonsín was democratically elected, he began an ambitious project of 
judicial reform. Alfonsín, in keeping with his objective of a clean break with the past, 
wanted to significantly reform the judiciary. The courts were institutionally weak after 
years of authoritarian rule. In addition, they were perceived not as independent and 
impartial arbiters of justice but as another tool of the authoritarian regime. According to 
Pilar Domingo the Argentinean Courts “reproduce an image of corruption and 
inefficiency and are not viewed as impartial administrators of justice of autonomous 
81 Cheems, 175. 
82 Skaar, 48.  
83 Smith, 279. 
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agents of constitutional and legal control”.84 Before the transition, the military had made 
efforts to keep the Supreme Court in place during the following government, and had 
tried to pass reforms to secure tenure. However, they were unsuccessful and the former 
judges had to step down. In keeping with attempts to democratize, Alfonsín appointed a 
new Supreme Court that was highly qualified and politically diverse. In addition, he 
replaced other federal courts, though not as completely (he kept the judges that were 
qualified a comparatively liberal). In addition Alfonsín wanted the courts to hold the 
criminals in the military accountable for their past wrongdoings, through trials.85 While 
these were generally positive developments, Alfonsín’s presidency was marked by 
political tension, and many of his reforms (particularly his diverse court) would not last 
after his government.  
 Alfonsín was succeeded by controversial Peronist president Carlos Menem. The 
Menem presidency would become known for the lack of judicial independence, 
particularly as it related to the Supreme Court. It was during Menem’s presidency that the 
1994 amendment to Argentina’s constitution was passed. This amendment addressed a 
broad range of issues that were established by Alfonsín and Menem in 1993, with the 
Acuerdo de Olivios.86 Judicial reform was among them. The reason that Menem 
approved reforms that might limit his power was that they came packaged in the 
amendment with the right to his reelection (which until the amendment, was prohibited in 
the Argentine constitution).  The court was a high priority for the Radicals, and less so for 
the Peronists. As a result the issue of the court became a major stumbling block for 
84 Cheems, 174. 
85 Skaar, 49. 
86 Jodi Finkel, "Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives Shape Institutional 
Change," Latin American Research Review 39, no. 3 (2004): 64.  
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negotiations. This changed when the sides were able to reach something of a 
compromise. Negotiators were informed that if  “Menem's administration would be 
willing to concede increased Radical participation in the Court, and greater control in the 
naming and obligations of judges" the process of constitutional reform could be 
accelerated, meaning that the reelection amendment that was a priority for Menem would 
be passed.87 
Many of the institutional reforms proposed were designed to limit the role of the 
executive in the judiciary.88 Chief among these was the creation of the Council of 
Magistrates. First instance and appellate level judges were previously selected by the 
executive (though they did have to be approved by senate). With the creation of the 
Council, a new process was put in place. The Council gave exams when a judicial 
opening became available, and then the President would select a nominee from the top 
three candidates. Additionally, while the President was still responsible for nominating 
court candidates, approval by the Senate required 2/3 supermajority instead of the 
previous simple majority.89 One ramification of this increase was a decrease in the 
capacity of an executive to pack courts, seeing as the opposition party would be 
necessary to approval. The 1994 amendment was an important reduction in executive 
power over the judiciary, but was not without its shortcomings. Primarily the constitution 
did not specify the practices for selecting the members of the Council of Magistrates. The 
only requirement was that members were "chosen periodically, with an equilibrium of 
representation from the political branches, judges from all instances, and members from 
87 Ibid., 66.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid.,68. 
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the legal community."90 Without any assurance that the selection of members was 
independent the Council of Magistrates was not guaranteed to be an impartial actor. This 
limits the effect it can have on judicial independence and the extent to which it can be 
considered a valid check on judicial subordination to the executive. Furthermore there 
were problems with implementation of the reforms. The Council of Magistrates was 
supposed to be operational by 1995, however this did not happen. 91 
Menem was not interested in an institutional body that would reduce his power to 
name judges. When the one-year period after the amendment was passed ended, 21 
federal judicial posts were vacant due to the fact that Menem couldn’t name them and the 
Council of Magistrates was not functioning.92 Menem did not end up meaningfully 
changing the composition of the judiciary. In reality, Menem’s greatest impact on the 
judiciary came before the constitutional amendment in 1989 when he packed the 
Supreme Court with people ideologically similar to him. He accomplished this in part by 
expanding the number of Supreme Court Justices from 5 to 9, and appointing the judges 
that filled the new positions.93 Court packing inhibited judicial independence 
significantly. Since the executive appointed most of the justices, the court did not serve as 
an impartial third party when making political decisions. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 
actions could be expected to be equivalent to the will of the executive.   
When Nestor Kirchner was elected president in 2003, he made it clear that 
judicial reform was a priority for his presidency. The institutional climate he inherited 
was not conducive to an independent judiciary, however. Of particular concern was how 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., 70. 
93 Ibid., 63. 
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he would handle the practice of complete overhaul of the Supreme Court that 
traditionally came with each new presidency.  Even though appointments were for life 
(according to the Constitution), regime change routinely meant a new Supreme Court. 
This was often cited as a primary cause of Argentina’s weak judicial independence.  
Nestor Kirchner, then, was faced with the paradox of wanting to reform a Supreme Court 
that was highly partisan, while at the same time not wanting to stack the court himself.94 
As a result he took a deliberately limited approach to judicial reform. This included 
purposely restraining the executives powers to appoint judges by issuing a decree stating 
that in the event of a vacancy on the court, the President would propose a candidate or 
candidates, and their names would be published in the Boletín Oficial and the Ministry of 
Justice website for a period of 30 days. During this period the candidate (or candidates) 
are subject to a significant screening process. This includes requiring the candidate to file 
a sworn statement listing affiliations (professional and otherwise) as well as an 
investigation of their tax history.  For the 15 days following the 30-day period of their 
names being published, objections and other comments can be filed (either by individuals 
or organizations).  When this comment period ends, the president has another 15 days to 
decide to submit the nomination or nominations to the senate. Then the senate must 
approve the nominees by a two-thirds vote.95 This marked a departure from previous 
practices. It allowed for the public to have a larger voice and requires the candidates to 
make significantly more information about themselves public. Prior to this decree, 
candidates were selected in closed (even middle of the night) sessions, without notifying 
94 Daniel Brinks, "Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Beginning of a New 
Millennium?" Texas International Law Journal 40 (2005): 608. 
95 Ibid., 609.  
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the public.96  In addition, he brought the Supreme Court back down to the size it had been 
before Menem’s court stacking. Not all of Nestor Kirchner’s judicial reforms were 
positive. While his handling of the Supreme Court was a democratic victory, he gave the 
executive a veto on the Council of Magistrates.97 This allowed for more executive control 
over the lower courts. Overall though, Kirchner’s presidency marked a small 
improvement from the past but there was still a ways to go before the judiciary could be 
considered functionally independent.  
Judicial Reform Under Fernández de Kirchner  
In spite of those improvements, the status of the judiciary in Argentina continued 
to be a point of political controversy. The role and level of autonomy of the judiciary is 
not a question that has been fully resolved.  While Nestor Kirchner’s reforms were 
generally considered to be some of the most democratic reforms his administration 
achieved98, his wife’s administration was not been nearly as successful in this respect. In 
2012, a World Economic Forum report ranked Argentina 133rd of 144 countries in 
judicial independence.99 This put them as the fourth worst in Latin America, above only 
Paraguay, Nicaragua and Venezuela.100  
 Fernández de Kirchner had long advocated for judicial reform, but made her most 
sweeping proposition in 2013. The six bills were promoted with rhetoric like at 
96 Ibid. 
97 "Imbalance of Powers," The Economist, December 18, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/12/argentinas-courts.  
98 Daniel Politi, "Cristina and the Supremes," The New York Times, July 5, 2013, 
http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/cristina-and-the-supremes/?_r=0. 
99 "Argentina and the Judiciary: Subverting the Rule of Law," Transparency International, April 18, 
2013,http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/argentina_and_the_judiciary_subverting_the_rule_of_law. 
100 "Imbalance of Powers."  
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"democratizing the judiciary," but critics saw it as the opposite.101 Though the reform 
came with some democratic benefits (such as mechanisms to limit judicial nepotism and 
making some information on lawsuits more publically available) the Supreme Court took 
issue with several elements that it saw as a major threat to judicial independence.102   
 The element that was most discussed as threatening judicial independence were 
the proposed reforms to the Council of Magistrates. As mentioned, the council is 
responsible for selecting judges (though not the Supreme Court). Made up of 13 members 
(comprised of representatives from all branches of the government, lawyers, and 
academics) members of the council have been internally elected by their peers.103 
However, under the reforms proposed in law 26,855, the majority would be popularly 
elected. The idea of a popular election is one of the ways Fernández de Kirchner 
defended her reforms as advancing democracy.  However in practice, her proposed 
reforms would have a much different effect. To be popularly elected, council members 
must be listed on party ballots during the election. This gives the ruling party substantial 
control over the council, which translates to their control of the courts.104 Going back to 
the framework established in “Building Democratic Institutions”, this is a clear example 
of a threat to the principle of detachment of judges from specific ideologies. Furthermore 
it contributes to the problem that plagued Argentina during the periods of instability, of 
courts not having enough ideological diversity to check the president.  
 Though critics saw the part of the reform package concerning the Council of 
101 Hugh Bronstein and Guido Nejamkis, "Argentine Congress Passes Judicial Reform Bill," Reuters, May 
08, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-courts-idUSBRE94801H20130509. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Politi.  
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Magistrates as the most blatant threat to judicial independence, another controversial part 
of the bill was how it handled injunctions against the State. The reforms would 
significantly limit injunctions against the state. While there are practical reasons for not 
wanting injunctions against the state, there are also major democratic drawbacks. 
Injunctions, like many mechanisms designed to protect, can be abused. They can prolong 
cases that should be swiftly resolved. However, by establishing more stringent 
requirements for injunctions against the state than in other sorts of disputes, the State has 
privileges that no other party has.105 In addition, there were serious political reasons that 
Fernández de Kirchner would want to limit injunctions against the state. Her 
controversial media law (discussed in the following chapter) had been rendered 
functionally ineffective by injunctions that projected Grupo Clarín.  
 As a result, the law was widely condemned by various members of the judiciary 
and international human rights community as diminishing judicial independence.106 
Nonetheless, in April 2013 all 6 bills were narrowly passed through congress. However a 
federal judge ruled the election of the council of Magistrates unconstitutional. The 
government filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. On June 18, 2013 the Supreme 
Court ruled (6-1) that several parts of the legislation were unconstitutional.107  In their 
statement on the decision to rule the law unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that "The judiciary has democratic legitimacy given by the Constitution, which is not 
105Lucia Duretta, “A Light at the End of the Tunnel for the Dramatic Decline of Justice and Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in Argentina,” International Judicial Monitor, Spring 2013, 
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_spring2013/judicialreformreport.html. 
106 "Argentina's Judicial Reforms Foiled," The Economist, June 21, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/06/argentina-s-judicial-reforms. 
107 Politi. 
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derived from direct election".108 As a result of this legitimacy, they argued the law was 
unconstitutional as it damages judicial independence by politicizing the judiciary.109  
 Though the Supreme Court’s decision was a victory for judicial independence, the 
fact remains that the judiciary functions no better than before Fernández de Kirchner’s 
proposal. There is widespread public concern, exacerbated by the death of Alberto 
Nisman, that the judiciary is one of many parts of the Argentinean government overrun 
by corruption. On January 19th, 2015 over 400,000 protestors marched In Buenos Aires 
after Nisman’s death. While organizers stated the demonstration was an apolitical show 
of support for the family of the deceased, the demonstrators themselves had a wide range 
of grievances with the government, most related to what they perceived as widespread 
corruption and attempts to concentrate power in the Fernández de Kirchner 
administration.110 Even though the 2013 reform attempts largely failed, they served as 
confirmation of Fernández de Kirchner’s willingness to subvert democratic checks on 
power to reinforce executive control. 
Macri and Judicial Independence 
 Throughout his campaign for presidency, Macri discussed judicial reform as a 
major issue. Upon his inauguration he reaffirmed this promise, citing his support for an 
independent judiciary as a major tenant of his administration. This in particular was a jab 
108 "Consejo De La Magistratura: Los Puntos Más Destacados Del Fallo De La Corte Suprema," La Nacion, 
June 8, 2013, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1593259-corte-suprema-declaro-inconstitucional-la-reforma-del-
consejo-de-la-magistratura-puntos-sali. Translation by Brito. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Simon Romero and Jonathan Gilbert, "March to Honor Dead Prosecutor Highlights Tensions Over 
Government in Argentina," The New York Times, February 18, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/world/americas/argentines-march-to-honor-dead-prosecutor-alberto-
nisman.html. 
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at the way the court had functioned under Kirchner. At his inauguration Marci reiterated 
this sentiment, stating,  “Under our government there will be no Macrista judges. Justice 
and democracy simply do not exist without an independent judiciary. But we must go 
along with justice in a process to clean it from political vices. Judges cannot be party 
militants.”111 The issue of the judiciary in general, but especially the Supreme Court was 
of particular relevance.  Since one Supreme Court Judge resigned in December 2014 and 
another in December 2015, there were two vacancies on the Supreme Court.112 These 
spots had remained vacant because of increasing opposition displeasure with Fernández 
de Kirchner had caused the opposition to make a pact not to approve any judges she 
proposed.  
 Macri took action almost immediately after his election to fill the two spots on the 
Supreme Court. However, since congress was in recess he completed it by decree. 
Specifically he used a constitutional clause that states that in situations like this the 
President “may fill up employment vacancies, which require an agreement by the Senate, 
and which may come up during its recess, through appointments in commission which 
will expire at the end of the following legislature.”113  What this means is that Macri was 
able to fill the positions without legislative oversight. He sidestepped the process as 
constitutionally outlined, which requires the nominees to go through a public hearing 
process and then receive a two-thirds vote of the Senate.  
   There were practical reasons for Macri’s decision. The Supreme Court at the time 
111 Del Río Roldán, Andrés. “Macri and the Judges” 
112 Valentiana Iricibar, "Macri Appointed Two Supreme Court Justices And Everyone’s Claws Came Out," 
The Bubble Argentina News, December 15, 2015, http://www.bubblear.com/macri-appointed-supreme-
court-justices.  
113 Luciana Bertoia, "President Skips Senate to Name Two Supreme Court Justices," Buenos Aires Herald. 
December 15, 2015.  http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/205006/president-skips-senate-to-name-
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only had three judges. The Court can technically function with three judges, because 
Argentine law states that for resolution to be passed, three judges must agree (a full court 
has five judges).114 However, it is functionally more difficult to get the only three judges 
to agree unanimously then to get three out of five to agree. By filling the vacancies, 
Macri was attempting to create a more functional Supreme Court. 
 Even so, because of his choice to use a decree, his decision proved controversial. 
Across the spectrum of Macri’s opposition the decision to use the decree was criticized as 
a setback for democratic rule in the country. The fact that he was able to use a decree was 
criticized, because it relied on an interpretation of the constitutional clause that was not 
universally accepted. In order for Macri to be able to appoint the justices by decree, he 
had to interpret the constitutional clause, which only specified “employment vacancies” 
to include Supreme Court Justices. Many people, like former Presidential Candidate and 
leader of the Generation for a National Union party, Margarita Stolbizer, believed that 
this interpretation was too liberal, saying not only that it was intended to refer to 
employment other than the Supreme Court (like army leaders and ambassadors) but 
saying that “Not even Cristina Fernández de Kirchner dared to do something like this.”115 
Even other more sympathetic political leaders, like Sergio Massa said, “The names [the 
candidates] are impeccable, but the manner, to me, was horrible”. 116 In addition to the 
discussion of whether or not the clause covered Supreme Court appointments is the issue 
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emergency decree.117 Macri had significant political reason to issue the decrees. Going 
through the senate would subject his nominees to approval by the opposing Peronist 
majority. As a result, critics saw his use of decree as a means to circumvent that.  This is 
supported by the argument of the necessity and urgency. In terms of urgency, filling the 
vacancies would allow the Supreme Court to function at a better level, and Macri had 
prioritized judicial reform. However, in terms of necessity, just because congress was in 
recess, did not mean that the only option was a decree. If Macri did want to fill the 
positions quickly, while keeping democratic mechanisms in place, he could have 
convened an extraordinary session.118 
 Beyond mere criticism a Federal Judge, Alejo Ramos Padilla, granted an 
injunction to suspend the judges a week after their appointment. The resolution stated “if 
the mechanism to appoint Justices to the Supreme Court is not valid, if neither the 
Constitution’s wording nor its spirit support it, if it affects the separation of powers and 
the judges’ independence, it’s necessary to put the constitutional mechanisms in 
motion as soon as possible to prevent the measure.”119Macri eventually decided to go 
through Senate with the nominations.  
 Ultimately, Macri’s decision to initially use an emergency decree to appoint two 
judges, and his claim that he was improving judicial independence is revealing of the 
117 Andrés Del Río, “President Macri and Judicial Independence on the Argentine Supreme Court,” Blog of 
the International Journal of Constitutional Law, Feb. 5, 2016, 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/02/president-macri-and-judicial-independence-on-the-argentine-
supreme-court/ 
118 Uki Goñi, “Argentinian president under fire for 'anti-democratic' decrees,” The Guardian, January 10, 
2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/10/argentinian-president-mauricio-macri-anti-
democratic-decrees. 
119 Demien Bio, "Macri’s Controversial Supreme Court Appointments Suspended By Judge," The Bubble 
Argentina News, December 21, 2015, http://www.bubblear.com/32821-2.  
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greatest issue that faces Argentinean democracy today. Though Macri was elected on the 
hope that he could improve Argentina’s democracy, he attempted to improve the 
functioning of the judicial branch through the least democratic means possible. Though 
the public pushback caused him to send the judges to Senate after all, his willingness to 
use Presidential decree (which was reliant on a liberal interpretation of the constitution) 
indicates that Macri has a place in the hyper-presidential tradition. The major issue with 
Macri’s attempt at Supreme Court appointments is not the appointments he made, or even 
a demonstrated desire to control the judiciary. Rather his use of decree indicates that he is 
willing for Argentina to remain a delegative democracy, which always runs the risk of 
being an illiberal one. Overextension of executive power, seen in different ways by both 
Fernández de Kirchner and Macri, can weaken judicial independence, which encourages 
further overextension of the executive. This cycle is a hurdle that must be overcome to 














  In 2009, Fernández de Kirchner proposed legislation that would entirely 
replace the dictatorship-era laws relating to the media. Law 26.522, according Fernández 
de Kirchner, was aimed at breaking up the media monopolies that had existed since the 
re-institution of democratic rule. The law was polarizing for the manner in which it gave 
the government involvement in regulation, and was one of the first things to be reformed 
when Macri took office. 
The Media and Democracy 
Liberal democracies have some sense of freedom of the press and of public 
communication. These rights are generally laid out in the constitution, however they must 
also be put into practice. A free press includes the obvious absences of violent 
censorship. However it is not only that. Any monopoly on information, whether that 
monopoly is coming from the government or corporate interests, limits the capacity of the 
media to fulfill the optimal function of a free press in a liberal democracy. In a liberal 
democracy the media should hold the government accountable and preserve a level of 
transparency with regards to government activities.  
 There are a number of criteria for a truly democratic media. Constitutional 
freedom of the press is only one part of the picture. Democracies must be a safe place for 
the press to function, which the government can ensure by not enacting violence against 
journalists themselves (commonly seen in non-democracies) and seeing that those who 
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do are held legally accountable.120  In addition those who use the media as a means of 
whistle blowing must be able to do so without fear of retribution, via libel laws. 
Internationally, libel is generally held to two standards. The first is that of “actual malice” 
That is, for something to be libelous plaintiffs have to prove that not only is the 
information false, but that the journalist knew or should have known that the information 
was false when they reported it. The second standard is “neutral reporting” which ensures 
that journalists cannot be sued for accurately reproducing information from an explicitly 
mentioned source, even if the information turns out to be false. This is counter to the 
prevailing idea in traditional Latin American (including Argentinean) laws of “desacato” 
which allowed for journalists to be punished criminally for what vaguely amounted to 
“disrespect of legal authorities”. 121 This is a legacy of the authoritarian government, and 
combined with the weakness of the press during and after the dictatorship, made media 
reform since 1983 challenging but necessary.  
Media During the Dictatorship 
 During the military dictatorship, media was for all intents and purposes, 
completely silenced. The period was marked by overt censorship. This is largely because 
the national reorganization process was dependent on secrecy regarding the widespread 
disappearances and other state-sanctioned violence against the political dissidents (real 
and perceived).  Because of this (and because journalists were often politically minded 
and critical of the government) during the dictatorship journalists were natural targets. 
The chapter of CONADEP’s official Nunca Más report that deals with the press 
120 Smith, 266. 
121 Smith, 269. 
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concludes “If one is to point to a sector of Argentine society that was singled out to be 
closely watched by the whole repressive and persecutory apparatus of the military 
government, then, inevitably, one must mention journalists”.122 Specifically, foreign 
journalists were expelled from the country, the Argentine Journalist’s Federation was 
taken under government control, and journalists themselves were targeted for 
disappearance by the reorganization process. Officially, government control of the media 
was codified in a law stating the offense of publishing opinions that were considered to 
be “upsetting, prejudicing or demeaning the activity of the Armed, Security, or Police 
Forces” was punishable by up to ten years in prison.123 Unofficially, the government 
controlled the press by creating a climate of fear among journalists. Though exact figures 
are difficult to find, it is estimated that in the first few months of the reorganization 
process more than 45 journalists were illegally detained and disappeared. The total 
number of journalists disappeared throughout the process is estimated to be more than 
100. In addition, this does not include the many journalists that were imprisoned without 
trial, nor the number of journalists that left Argentina out of fear of the government.124  
 The result was that the military was relatively effective at silencing any 
opposition, and was for practical purposes in control of the media. There were some 
notable exceptions, however. Traditionally leftist newspaper La Opinion was at times 
critical of the military government, albeit inconsistently. In addition, English language 
daily “The Buenos Aires Herald” was consistently critical, and made efforts to publicize 
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the violence undertaken by the military governments.125 Both of these papers often found 
themselves threatened by the military, however, and were only a few voices, compared to 
the government-controlled press apparatus. As a result, the media was not a meaningful 
check on government power.  
Media During the Transition 
 An end to the military dictatorship brought an end to direct censorship, but the 
institutional weakness of the media means it did not result in an immediately functional 
press system. A 1997 New York Times article discussing press freedom in Latin America 
put it thusly “freedom of the press remains a goal rather than a reality across much of the 
region [Latin America], and often the antagonists of free speech are the democratically 
elected governments promising to protect it”.126 Though no longer explicitly threatening 
journalists, the government still managed to exert control.  
 The issue of restraints on instigative journalism was present during the transition. 
In 1992, Menem charged an investigative reporter with descato, which was then still a 
criminal offense. The reporter, Horacio Verbitsky, appealed to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. The IAHR ruled in Verbitsky’s favor, which resulted in 
negotiations that would end in the repeal of the descato law in Argentina. This did not 
establish standards of actual malice and neutral reporting. In fact, several years later 
Verbitsky would attempt to introduce those standards in relation to other defamation 
125 Tim R. Samples, Of Silence and Defiance: A Case Study of the Argentine Press during the “Proceso” of 
1976-1983. The University of Texas at Austin, 2004. 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/etext/llilas/ilassa/2008/samples.pdf 
126 David J. Park, "Media, Democracy, and Human Rights in Argentina," Journal of Communication 
Inquiry 26, no. 3 (July 2002):242.   
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cases, with little success. In 1999, new President De La Rua tried to take action, however 
when a scandal broke out and journalists reported 11 senators were involved in a bribery 
scandal, backlash against the press stalled the bill, halting efforts to establish those 
standards.127  
 Another way to look at the limits on press freedom during the transition is through 
the lens of “media politics”, or how various institutions, including the government and 
the church, influenced different media outlets.128 In the early days of the transition, the 
press was dominated by more conservative voices. These outlets included La Razón, 
which had historically been linked with the intelligence sector, and La Nación, which was 
considered “the voice of the establishment” and deeply connected to the Catholic 
Church.129 Clarín was one of the only major newspapers that was not right leaning, 
however in the late nineties it did “not practice anything akin to day-by-day aggressive 
investigative reporting”.130 This weak press was a direct legacy of the dictatorship. If the 
military junta suffocated all press outlets that were not sympathetic (or at least 
indifferent) to them, even after the dictatorship ended the media would be skewed.  
The transition to democracy was also marked by economic reforms that would 
have a profound impact on the press. Like the other neoliberal reforms that took place 
during the Menem regime, these reforms favored the liberalization of markets, reforms 
that would profoundly shape the Argentinean media landscape. The results of these 
reforms were a series of mergers and acquisitions that resulted in the increasing 
127 Smith,. 269. 
128 Park, 243. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., 244. 
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concentration of media outlets in a few hands. By the end of the 1990s, Argentinean 
media was dominated by three major media conglomerates. 131 
One major conglomerate that achieved dominance during the period of transition 
was Grupo Clarín. Grupo Clarín consists of the largest newspaper (by circulation) in 
Argentina as well as partnerships with various provincial newspapers. They also own one 
of the main television channels in Buenos Aires and several channels in the interior, and a 
radio station network.  On the distribution side, they own the leading cable television 
distribution system, and several cable television signals. The also have numerous other 
involvements in things like Internet and movie production.132 Media concentration, as 
emerged in the period after military dictatorship, can threaten a democratic press. Less 
diversity of media outlets translates to less diversity of ideas.   
The 1980s and 90s also featured some attempted government actions that 
threatened the media. The government considered increasing the sentence for a libel 
conviction, as well as amending the constitution to include a right-of-reply rule that 
would allow anyone who believed they were wronged in the press to publish a reply. In 
addition the Senate proposed a rule that would allow congressmen to arrest and detain 
anyone who wrote or broadcast anything that was offensive to them.133 Although these 
laws did not pass, they indicate that the media was still struggling to become a fully 
democratic institution. Furthermore, the government’s control of media licenses allowed 
them a degree of control over the airwaves. 134 
131 Ibid., 245. 
132Martin Becerra and Guillermo Mastrini, "The Audiovisual Law of Argentina and the Changing Media 
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The transitional period exemplified part of the reason that creating a dynamic 
media after an authoritarian government is so difficult. In addition to the difficulties 
posed by an industry recovering from overt censorship, creating a democratic media 
requires a level of balance. It is easy for government policies to restrict the functioning of 
the media (be it by libel laws, controlling media licenses, or other means). However, 
government non-intervention can also be dangerous when it results in too much corporate 
control.  After the return to democracy, government policy generally favored non-
intervention with the media. It was the presidency of Fernández de Kirchner, her conflicts 
with the media, and her subsequent proposal of Law 26.522 that marked a shift away 
from this trend.  
Fernández de Kirchner and the Media 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner had several conflicts with the media. In 2009, the 
government nationalized the broadcast of all televised soccer games under an initiative 
called Fútbol para Todos (Football for All). Broadcasting the games on the state-run 
public television channel, instead of the Grupo Clarín-owned network was 
controversial.135 The primary reason for the controversy stemmed from the fact that the 
soccer games, which have a high viewership (which would only increase on the public 
network) could now be used for unlimited government advertising. This criticism was not 
unfounded, as since the decision, soccer matches heavily feature advertising supporting 
135Juan Forero, “Argentina scores points with free broadcasts of soccer games,” The Washington Post, 
November 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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the government.136  
Tension between the media and the government became particularly strong when 
Fernández de Kirchner proposed a wide-ranging media reform law, aimed largely at 
Grupo Clarín. Though Grupo Clarín was at one time generally supportive of Kirchner and 
her policies, that began to change in 2007. The newspaper Clarín published an article 
insinuating that the Kirchner campaign may have received a large secret contribution. In 
addition, in 2008 Clarín sided with striking farmers, in conflict with Kirchner’s increased 
export taxes on agricultural products. That’s when the president entered what was a 
largely adversarial relationship with the media conglomerate, culminating in her largest 
reform proposal, Law 26.522, or “the Audiovisual Law”.137 Kirchner and her supporters 
claimed the law aimed to further democratize the media, by limiting what they claimed 
was a dangerous monopoly. 
The law was proposed to replace a law that had been enacted in 1980, during the 
military dictatorship. This law, Law 22285, gave a few major media companies nearly 
complete control over the Argentine media.  Law 26.522 marked several basic changes 
from the military era law. It lowered the number of broadcasting licenses a company 
could hold from 24 to 10. Controversially, it gave companies that had more than that 
allotted amount 1 year to sell them. Companies claimed that not only would this force 
them to sell licenses at a very low price but that these licenses would eventually end up in 
the hands of groups and businesses close to the government. The law also divided the 
airwaves into thirds, with one third going to the private sector one to the government and 
136Sara Rafsky, “In government-media fight, Argentine journalism suffers,” Committee to Protect 
Journalists, September 27, 2012, https://cpj.org/reports/2012/09/amid-government-media-fight-argentine-
journalism-suffers.php. 
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one to non-profits. The law gave the executive branch the right to assign licenses in cities 
where the population exceeded 500,000. Seventy percent of radio and sixty percent of 
television had to be produced in Argentina. Unless they arranged a partnering 
cooperative, telephone companies could not participate in the cable business. 
Additionally, the law regulated the distribution of advertising available to private 
channels, but did not regulate official advertising that promoted governmental work or 
actions.138  
An important part of the law was the establishment of a new regulatory agency for 
communications, the Federal Administration of Audiovisual Communication (AFSCA).  
Kirchner appointed Martín Sabbatella as the first Director of AFSCA.139 He was a 
loyalist to Kirchner and her party. This exemplified what a major criticism of the law 
was: if the president how the power to control the leadership of the independent 
regulatory body, it could not effectively serve as an independent regulatory body. Instead, 
it would act as a method for carrying out the will of the executive. This was further 
exemplified by the makeup of the board. The board was made up of seven members. Two 
of these members were chosen by the executive. Three were chosen by the Comision 
Bicameral, based on the composition of congress. The other two are chosen from 
candidates nominated by the Federal Council for Audiovisual Communication 
(CFCA).140 This composition gave the executive (especially when considering the ruling 
party) significant influence over the composition of the board.  
138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 
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Congress passed the law on October 10, 2009.141 However, the law was subject to 
immediate criticism from the opposition, who viewed it as simply transferring the power 
of the media monopoly from larger corporations (like Grupo Clarín) to the government, a 
clear threat to democracy. As a result, supporters and opponents of the law entered a legal 
battle that would last for years, effecting the implementation of the law. The law placed 
the executive branch under Kirchner at odds with the judicial branch, as the 
implementation of the law was blocked by a series of injunctions and appeals. There were 
several specific parts of the law that Grupo Clarín challenged. Article 41 makes media 
licenses non-transferrable. Article 45 includes measures to limit the amount of media 
licenses a company can hold.  Article 48 ruled out the legal concept of “vested rights” 
and Article 161 limited the adaptation term to one year.142 In 2012, Grupo Clarín won a 
victory, when a court ruled that it could not be forced to sell its licenses before the 
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of articles 45 and 161.143 
Throughout the legal battle the legacy of the dictatorship was ever-present. 
Proponents of the law cited Grupo Clarín’s dealings during the dictatorship as reason for 
its dismantling. In a more personal case, the Kirchner government led an investigation 
into the children of Clarín’s largest stakeholder and heirs to the shares, Marcela and 
Felipe Noble Herrera. Specifically, claims were made that Marcela and Felipe were the 
141 Simon Romero and Emily Schmall, "Battle Between Argentine Media Empire and President Heats Up 
Over a Law," The New York Times. Nov. 30, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/world/americas/media-law-ratchets-up-battle-between-kirchner-and-
clarin-in-argentina.html 
142 “The Supreme Court declares the constitutionality of the Media Law,” Télam, November 29, 2013, 
http://www.telam.com.ar/english/notas/201310/852-the-supreme-court-declares-the-constitutionality-of-
the-media-law.html. 
143 Simon Van Woerden, “Media Law Reform Pits Argentine Executive Branch Against Judiciary,” 
Americas Quarterly, December 7, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/media-law-reform-pits-
argentine-executive-branch-against-judiciary 
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children of women killed during the dictatorship.144 Though DNA tests would eventually 
disprove this, it is indicative of the manner in which the legacy of the dictatorship was 
used to tarnish Grupo Clarín in the court of public opinion. Kirchner supporters often 
repeated the tagline “Clarín Lies” in relation to the media group.145 Kirchner and her 
supporters framed the new law as a way to break apart a monopoly, and specifically one 
that was complicit and therefore culpable in the military dictatorship. At the same time 
critics of the law viewed it as equally undemocratic.  
Indeed the main concerns were not with the general goals of the law (to break up 
large media conglomerates) but rather with how they could (and presumably, would, be 
used). While international groups and human rights activists across the political spectrum 
supported taking the control of the media out of so few hands, the primary concern would 
be that it would silence critics of the government. These concerns proved themselves not 
unfounded. A 2013 report by the IAPA found that 96 percent of new media licenses 
granted since the law went to government or pro-government entities, indicating that the 
law was being abused.146  Even so, the law had considerable support. The UN Special 
Rappatour on Freedom of Expression went as far as to call it a model for the continent.147 
In 2013, 4 years after the law was passed by congress, it was held up in it’s entirety by 
the Supreme Court.148 
144 Romero Battle Between Argentine Media Empire and President Heats Up Over a Law”. 
145 Ibid. 
146 "Freedom of the Press: Argentina," Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2015/argentina.  
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Macri and the Media Law 
 When Kirchner left office and was replaced by Macri, her controversial media 
law was one of the first things to go. Specifically, Macri eliminated the AFSCA and the 
AFTIC, instead establishing the ENACOM and sponsoring a new law to replace Law 
26.522. In charge of the ENACOM, Macri appointed a long time ally of his, Miguel de 
Godoy.149 By eliminating the organizations that were critical to the Audiovisual Law, and 
stating intentions to re-loosen restrictions on media corporations, Macri was reverting to 
the pre-Fernández de Kirchner practice of general non-intervention with the media. In 
addition, two things are notable about how these changes were brought about. The first is 
that much like Fernández de Kirchner and her supporters claimed Law 26.522 was 
protecting and furthering democracy, Macri and his supporters used democratic rhetoric 
to defend his changes to the law. According to his cabinet chief, Marcos Pena, Macri’s 
reforms marked “the end of the war against journalism”. 150 The second and most 
relevant part is that these changes were made very quickly after Macri was elected, while 
the legislature was in recess. They were made, therefore, by decree.151  
 The use of decree immediately faced criticism from the opposition, and much like 
opposition to the original Media Law, it is framed as a subversion of democracy. 
Legislator Diana Conti claimed  “The Media Law is not a law that came from the 
political power but from the people, so they are not only closing down the AFSCA but 
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also freedom of expression and popular will”.152 The use of decree to quickly limit a law 
that had been passed by congress indicates an abuse of executive power.  
 A country where the government controls too much of the media is not a country 
where the press operates democratically. Though the press is extra-governmental, they 
can and should still operate as a check on the power of the government through warranted 
criticism and increased transparency. While the press is separate from the government, it 
still subject to government regulation, meaning the government can stop the media from 
functioning democratically. That was happened in Argentina during the Fernández de 
Kirchner administration. Macri’s decision to gut her media law through emergency 
decree, however, was also undemocratic. Furthermore, a media controlled by corporate 
interests, when those are entwined with government interest will also not meaningfully 
serve a democracy. Looking forward, Macri’s changes to the media law could have 
different outcomes. In the best-case scenario for democracy, Macri was using a non-
democratic mechanism for ultimately democratic objectives (taking control of the media 
out of government hands). In the worst-case scenario he was using a non-democratic 
mechanism for non-democratic objectives (putting control back into the hands of 
monopolistic companies). 
 Overall, both Fernández de Kirchner’s law and Macri’s subsequent dismantling of 
much of the law fail to achieve the necessary balance between government regulation and 
non-intervention necessary for the media to function democratically. Fernández de 
Kirchner’s hyper-presidential tendencies tainted the stated democratic intentions of her 
152 "'They Are Subjugating Popular Will, Freedom of Expression,'" The Buenos Aires Herald, December 
30, 2015, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/205830/they-are-subjugating-popular-will-freedom-of-
expression.  
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reforms, by allowing them to be used to reinforce executive strength. Alternatively, 
Macri’s hyper-presidentialist use of decree to undo a critical piece of the reform allows 
for the same problems that limited the media’s capacity to function dynamically 





















Conclusions on the Future of Institutional Reform 
 
 Upon closer examination, three of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s most far 
reaching reforms (her intelligence reform bill, her judicial reform bill, and her media 
law), though all purported to be democratizing institutions that had suffered under the 
dictatorship, actually ranged from inefficient to harmful to democracy. They were both a 
result of and a contribution to the tradition of hyper-presidentialism in Argentina, which 
has plagued both early Argentinean democracy and the recent democracy that emerged 
after the military junta. Further changes to these institutions by President Macri also 
indicate an emphasis on executive power that is likely to hinder substantive institutional 
reform. 
This is because, for several reasons, hyper-presidentialism is self-reinforcing. 
When the president has a lot of authority, officially or unofficially, through the powers in 
the constitution or the power they gain from control of their party, they are able to act in a 
way that gives them more power. By strengthening their power over the judiciary, or 
using presidential decree to appoint Supreme Court justices, for example, the judiciary is 
then less likely to serve as a meaningful check. If a president uses a friendly legislature to 
pass laws granting them more control over intelligence service, then they are going to 
able to use that for more political gain.  
  Furthermore, the longer a country exhibits the signs of hyper-presidentialism, the 
less likely they are to go away. More often than not, the strengthening of the executive 
means the weakening of other institutions. When the intelligence sector is less 
autonomous, the judicial branch less independent, and the media less separate, they are 
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not only legally constrained, but also less capable of performing their democratic 
functions. Re-establishing them becomes more difficult, intensive, and costly.  
Finally, history proves to be a difficult thing to overcome. In the early days of the 
transition, recent instability and the threat of military intervention could be indicated as 
justifications for presidential decrees and the role of a strong executive. Though in recent 
years that threat seems far less imminent the legacy of the dictatorship still plays an 
important role in politics. This is encapsulated by the fact that all three of Fernández de 
Kirchner’s reforms were touted by her and supporters as increasing the quality of 
democracy. Often direct references to the dictatorship were made. When a democratic 
government emerges from a period of state-sponsored repression the willingness of the 
people to support democracy, even when that democracy is not strictly liberal, because it 
is so far superior to the alternative can contribute to hyper-presidentialism and prevent 
the full consolidation of democracy.  
In order to predict what Fernández de Kirchner’s reforms, and Macri’s subsequent 
responses, indicate about the future of hyper-presidentialism and democracy in 
Argentina, it is necessary to consider the typologies of democracy discussed in chapter 1, 
keeping in mind that delegative democracy generally refers to how policy is enacted, and 
illiberal democracy primarily refers to the nature of those policies. Fernández de 
Kirchner’s intelligence reform, judicial reform, and media law all passed through the 
legislature (albeit one dominated by her own party). However they all served her political 
interests more than they improved democracy. Additionally, Macri’s responses, for the 
most part, have been delegative, even when they were not illiberal. His decree that shifted 
wiretapping away from the office of the attorney general (which had given substantial 
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power to Fernández de Kirchner) was a re-strengthening of the capacity of the 
intelligence sector to function democratically (though there were also likely political 
motivations). His (eventually failed) attempt to appoint two Supreme Court judges by 
decree would have resulted in a more highly functioning court, and they were not 
unqualified, but he completely sidestepped the constitutionally outlined process. The 
most controversial of the steps was his media law, wherein he dismantled a crucial 
element of the law passed by the legislature with a decree. All of these responses also 
were motivated, not by democracy, but rather by the political motives of the executive. 
This indicates that, hyper-presidentialism is far from over in Argentina. Argentina’s 
intelligence sector, judiciary, and media still need reforms in order to function 
democratically, however the continued use of executive power to protect presidential 
political interests indicates that significant reforms will not come without ending the 
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